It is important to insert a brief
clarification in the discussion at this point. While military philosophes
constructed a tactical system using information from antiquity, their
conclusions were not always accurate. David Larmour makes a compelling argument
that the Revolutionary Government “re-membered” antiquity in order to fit it to
their own needs and ideals. [1]
The same might be said of the development of the ordre profond, as
military philosophes exaggerated and blurred the reality of classical
battlefields. For example, the canonical writings of Polybius and Vegetius held
in common that they were written about ideal Roman tactical systems, not actual
tactical systems. This little-mentioned detail means that the military philosophes
based their arguments on Roman legions which never actually existed, just as
Machiavelli had done two-hundred years before them.[2]
Furthermore, ancient authors like Caesar had a vested interest in making their
battles appear both humane and decisive, yet in reality this was often not the
case. Therefore it should be kept in mind what the military philosophes thought
and what was actually the case are two different things. In fact, in many
cases, the realities which eighteenth-century tacticians and the instructions which
classical authors provided were two very opposite things. For example, Vegetius
recommended that “every plan . . . is to be considered, every expedient tried,
and every method taken” before battle was accepted, and if it was, “Good
officers [would] decline general engagements where the danger is common, and
prefer the employment of stratagem and finesse to destroy the enemy as much as
possible in detail and intimidate them without exposing [their] own forces.” [3]
However, military philosophes were
looking for system to prevent this exact, indecisive approach. However,
tacticians were willing to overlook such discrepancies in their effort to ‘re-member’
antiquity.
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