The Ordre Profond

            French tacticians drew from antiquity one key system: the ordre profond (the deep order). The ordre profond was based on the examples of both the Greek phalanx and the Roman legions, combining elements of both into a large, deep column formation. This stood in opposition to the ordre mince, or line formation. Though the ordre profond had a number of different forms and went through a number of different stages, in principle it relied on its depth and mass to advance quickly and break the thin line of enemy troops.[1] Generally speaking, the ordre profond was as dense as possible, usually consisting of anywhere between 200 and 2000 soldiers, all tightly packed. Given their faith in the universal principles of war mentioned above, many commanders were confident that even a small number of troops employed correctly could deliver the necessary decisive blow at the opportune moment. By 1791, the column had been outlined in the Règlement of the field army, and instructions were given for every manoeuvre and procedure which a soldier in column would be required to know.[2] Therefore, despite their many differences, proponents of the ordre profond agreed that, for the following reasons, the ordre would lead French armies to victory.

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[1] Quimby, 27.

[2] Lacroix, xli.  The Règlement, also called the Ordinance, is cited in this bibliography as the Rules and regulations for the field exercise and manoeuvres of the French infantry, written by Lacroix, as the copy used is a translated and re-published copy. However, it will be referred to as the Règlement in the text in order to remain consistent with other scholarship.

Reason One: Quick and Decisive Attack

Foremost, the ordre profond was an ideal solution for the ancien régime armies because it could allow a quick and decisive attack. While the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries had been plagued by slow and destructive sieges and long and expensive campaigns which often amounted to very little, the ordre profond promised an end to such stalemates. Based on the experiences of the Seven Years’ War, Henry Lloyd concluded that battles were inconclusive, stating that “no kingdom is overturned – no nation is enslaved” by the recent wars. [1] By breaking the enemy line swiftly while on the field, the ordre profond would ideally force a retreat or surrender, and save the attacker from continuing a long campaign or besieging enemy strongholds. Saxe, for example, suggested that if the column could force a retreat, a commander could capitalize on the enemy’s sudden weakness even against greater numbers: “The pursuit should be pushed to the limit. And the retreat which had appeared such a satisfactory solution will be turned into a rout. A detachment of ten thousand men can destroy an army of one hundred thousand in flight.” [2] Furthermore, deploying into an attacking column from the march was theoretically much faster than deploying into line, and could therefore save hours of pre-battle preparation.[3] As a result, battle was much easier to force upon an enemy.[4] Previously, an unwilling enemy could avoid battle by not presenting an attacker with time and space to deploy troops into line, gaining time to regroup his own army and wait for reinforcements, and forcing the attackers to lose their advantage. However, the ordre profond required less time and space, and could consequently force battle whenever conditions were favourable. When battle was presented, proceeding across the battlefield in column would save time and confusion by allowing troops to navigate around obstacles and terrain quickly and efficiently, a problem which had plagued the ordre mince.[5] In making battle swift, the tacticians hoped the ordre profond would also make it conclusive. Therefore, tacticians and philosophes hoped that the column would decide not only the day, but the entire campaign. By reducing war to a single battle, warfare would be less expensive, less destructive, more humane and, most importantly, successful.

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[1] Lloyd, quoted in Starkey, 57.

[2] Saxe, “My Reveries,” 161.

[3] Phillips, 219.

[4] Ostwald, “The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies,” 662.

[5] Griffith suggests that in order to cross the battlefield in line, troops would frequently have to break down into a column to bypass obstacles, then reform line, disrupting the momentum of the advance greatly. Furthermore, he states, the job of maintaining an organized line over what could easily by a 6-mile long front was a “staff officer’s nightmare,” and offered little mobility. Griffith, French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics, 6-7.

Reason Two: Desertion

Second, the ordre profond was proposed as a solution to desertion problems. It was largely agreed that the ordre mince provided too much space for indecision and panic, especially in troops that did not have the robotic constitution of the Prussian or British line soldiers. A battlefront which could extend upwards of six miles simply did not allow for enough supervision to effectively counter desertion.[1] Additionally, the long and drawn out waits during the battle for deployment, positioning, and repositioning allowed soldiers hours to reconsider their decision to forfeit their lives; far too many found the time to decide against such a course of action. The ordre profond, on the other hand, would not be plagued by these problems. By grouping troops in a confined mass, soldiers would be held together and propelled by the momentum of the soldiers beside, behind, and in front of them.[2] Folard argued that only those in the front of the column would be susceptible to panic, yet these soldiers would be forced forward by those behind them. The soldier in the back ranks, on the other hand, would be unable to see the enemy and be encouraged by the forward motion of those ahead.[3] Propelled by the swift action and momentum of the column, soldiers would not have the time to reconsider, a vital step in countering panic.[4] Caught in the swift momentum of battle, soldiers would charge towards the enemy before they had the time to think twice. Meanwhile, swift and decisive victories would prevent battlefield panic and horrors, giving the soldiers far less reason to desert.

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[1] Griffith, French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics, 7.

[2] Ibidem.

[3] Folard, in Quimby, 30.

[4] Accordingly, Frederick the Great claimed that "If my soldiers began to think, not one would remain in the ranks." Frederick, quoted in John Levi Martin, “The Objective and Subjective Rationalization of War,” Theory and Society 34, no.3 (Sept. 2005): 234.

Reason Three: Avoiding Firearms

Third, the ordre profond was also preferable in that it avoided the need for any excessive use of firearms. Muskets, as mentioned, were slow to reload, cumbersome, and inaccurate. Furthermore, the thick white smoke clouds from the gunpowder blurred troops’ vision, and it was often necessary to either fire blindly or to wait for the smoke to clear.[1] Many went so far as to blame the French losses in the Seven Years’ War entirely on firearms.[2] Tacticians argued that the French character – specifically the Frenchman’s passion for and skill on the offensive – would more than make up for a loss of firepower.[3] Consequently, what the column lost in firepower it made up for with cold steel, or arme blanche. Even Voltaire suggested that “the fire of the French is . . . usually inferior to that of other nations;” yet “the French nation attacks with the greatest impetuosity . . . it is very difficult to resist its shock.” [4] Lazare Carnot, a Revolutionary-era Minister of War, argued that arme blanche “has always been more brilliant, more efficacious, and more protracted than the defence with firearms.” [5] The fast pace attack which the ordre profond allowed would reduce the amount of time troops spent under enemy fire, and thereby reduce the need to fire back. Armed with bayonets or pikes, soldiers would pierce enemy ranks quickly and efficiently. Thus, the ordre profond worked on a strategic level while at the same time better fit with the spirit and élan of the independent, creative, and courageous French character.[6] Not only would the soldier be in a better position tactically, but he would be more inspired, more motivated, and more comfortable with the work of his own steel.

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[1] Saxe, “My Reveries,” 110.

[2] Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 35.

[3] Saxe, “My Reveries,” 145.

[4] Voltaire, quoted in Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 187.

[5] It is important to note here that Frederick the Great did not agree with this. Despite initial writings agreeing with limiting the role of firearms in battle, Frederick later concluded that ‘to attack the enemy without procuring oneself the advantage of superior, or at least equal fire, is to wish to fight against an armed troop with clubs, and this is impossible.’ Frederick, quoted in Phillips, 165; Lazare Carnot,  A Treatise on the Defence of Fortified Places, written under the direction and published by the Command of Buonaparte for the Instruction and Guidance of the Officers of the French Army, trans. Lt.-Col. Baron de Montalembert (London: Whitehall Military Library, 1814), 93.

[6] This idea continued just as strongly into the Revolutionary wars (Marshal MacDonald claiming quite blatantly that “the French character lends itself better to attack than defense. Jacques MacDonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum, ed. Camille Rousset, trans. Stephen Louis Simeon (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1893), 103); It is not surprising then, that by the Revolutionary Period, the bayonet was so celebrated that, Lynn suggests, it was a “revolutionary symbol to rival the red liberty cap and the tricolor cockade” which “evoked images of citizen-soldiers braving death at close quarters to defend the Patrie. Like a Crusader’s cross,” Lynn notes, “it seemed to insure victory by its very presence.” Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 188-189.

Reason Four: A Nice Shape

Fourth, the ordre profond was appealing simply for the fact that it was a geometric system. Ancien régime tacticians and commanders, particularly during the eighteenth century, were very attached to linear and geometric systems, and the ordre profond did not stray from these traditions.[1] The desire to maintain orderly and systematic battlefields was the foremost cause of this attraction to geometric systems. Such linearity evoked authority, control, discipline and order, and in this way appealed as much to the theorist as they did the general.[2] Though a seemingly shallow motive, such an appearance could serve to demoralize an opponent, especially an unorganized one.[3] However, deeper cultural feelings were also perhaps behind the desire to maintain geometric formations. Even briefly skimming the texts of Vegetius or Polybius inspires a deep sense of the importance of geometric formations on and off the battlefield. Geometric systems were a fundamental part of how the ancien régime commander or tactician felt war ought to be fought, at least according to the universal principles of war. Thus, along with the number of reasons why ancien régime commanders and tacticians felt that the ordre profond was both acceptable ideologically and ideal in a practical sense, perhaps equally important was that the ordre profond was simply the right shape.

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[1] John France, “Close Order and Close Quarter: The Culture of Combat in the West,” The International History Review 27, no. 3 (September 2007): 498.

[2] Martin, 241.

[3] Ibid., 251; In this, philosophes were likely supported by Arrian’s accounts of Alexander’s military effectiveness through his use of the Macedonian pezhetairoi phalanx, which on one occasion, Arrian reports, was able to cause an enemy to retreat from the battlefield simply by manoeuvring and performing extremely well-executed drills. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, ed. and trans. Aubrey de Selincourt (London: Penguin, 1971), 52.